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Abstract: This Special Issue (SI) of Space and Polity profiles the varied contributions of 
geographical inquiry to scholarly debates on the causes, meaning and implications of the UKs 
decision to Brexit from the EU. By way of framing the SI, this Introduction develops the 
argument that insofar as it is confronting, complicating and challenging geographical ideas 
and debates, Brexit recursively is intruding on and perhaps even implicating itself in the 
structuration of geographic thought and practice, most immediately in the UK and in European 
states particularly impacted (not least Ireland) and especially with respect to political 
geographical research.  We develop this argument through five provocations, questioning the 
ways in which Brexit exists as a troubling reality for: a) critical policy studies; b) the project 
of decolonising geography; c) historiographies of human territorialisation and sovereignty; d) 
the status of evidence-based public policy in a post-political and post-truth age, and; e) the 
management of risk, hazards, and disasters. A completing/completed Brexit we conclude, may 
bequeath a tradition of ‘Brexit Geographies’ and therein leave an enduring signature on the 
history of Anglo-European geographic thought. 
 




The United Kingdom (UK) joined the European Economic Community (EEC) on January 1st 
1973 and remained a committed member of this community for 43 subsequent years as it 
broadened (incrementally to 28 member states) and deepened (morphed into the world’s most 
sophisticated supra-national political union,  ‘the European Union’ (EU)). On June 23rd 2016, 
the UK held a plebiscite on the status of its ongoing membership: with a turnout of 72.2%, 
51.9% voted to ‘Leave the EU’.  On March 29th  2017, UK Prime Minister Theresa May 
invoked ‘Article 50’ of the Treaty on European Union, announcing the UKs intention to exit 
the EU in an orderly fashion; firstly by entering into a two-year withdrawal negotiation and 
secondly on successful conclusion of this negotiation by brokering a new relationship with the 
EU as a fully external but ‘special’ non-member state.  On November 14th 2018, a technical 
agreement was reached between the UK and the EU with regard to the terms of withdrawal.  
Subject to ratification of this Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will officially/legally leave the 
EU on March 29th 2019, following an expected twenty-one month transition period will 
practically/materially leave on December 31st 2020,  and from January 1st 2021 will (it hopes) 
begin a new bespoke relationship with the bloc. But failure to conclude this agreement could 
yet precipitate a ‘no deal’ outcome and trigger a disorderly ‘Brexit’ (British exit from the EU), 
a possibility which fills every party (with the exception of committed Brexiteers) with deep 
foreboding (see Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
  
Our motive for convening this SI is to interrogate the ways in which Brexit presents as an object 
of analysis for human geographers. Brexit is proving to be immediately traumatic for res 
publica, impinging upon the polity in multiple, and sometimes unpredictable, ways. Whatever 
form it will eventually take, it is clear that the series of secession challenges it embodies and 
in turn has triggered will have profound long-term territorial ramifications for both the EU and 
the UK, a multi-nation, yet highly centralised state. Evidently, even if the preferred outcome 
in any future ‘people’s vote’, there can be no return to the status quo. The papers offered here 
do not pretend to provide a comprehensive panoramic snapshot of geographical writings on 
Brexit; what they do offer, however, is an indication of the emergent multiplicity of Brexit’s 
geographical dimensions, including its origins, its social, economic, political and cultural 
impacts, and its potential legacies. Contributors ruminate on topics as diverse as the aetiology 
of Brexit in a gradual exhaustion of consent for the neoliberal political economic mainstream 
in English regions (Macleod and Jones); the spatial grammars, lexicons and imaginaries which 
have been deployed to render Brexit intelligible (but which more often obfuscate, Sykes);  the 
extent (or not) to which Brexit signals a fundamental recalibration in the UKs two party 
electoral hegemony (Johnston et al.), the impact of Brexit on the Irish border and the Irish 
border on Brexit (papers by Hayward and Anderson), the new politics of hospitality, 
estrangement and belonging wrought by Brexit in both the UK (Cassidy et al.) and in Ireland 
(Wood and Gilmartin), the much neglected gender politics of Brexit (MacLeavy) and the 
differential implications of Brexit for rural and agricultural communities in different locations 
(Maye et al.).   
 
Vital geographies which speak to the grand challenges of the day are by their very nature risky 
and precarious. What needs emphasising is that the papers included in this SI, as also this 
Introduction, have been written while Brexit has been unfolding. Ours is a restless, dynamic, 
and incomplete subject matter; our stocktaking, interpretations and commentaries are 
necessarily tentative, provisional and at times conjectural. Clearly acute problems attend to the 
analysis of such a dynamic process; the importance of Brexit, however, dictates that such 
analysis is undertaken, even at the peril of being overtaken by events and quickly rendered 
obsolete. Nearly half a century ago, in a themed intervention published in the Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers (TIBG) and titled, Geography and public policy: 
challenges, opportunities and implications, Terry Coppock questioned the adequacy of the 
contribution of geographers to public policy, whether that be at the point of policy conception, 
prototyping, piloting, enactment or evaluation. ‘If we do not seek to demonstrate our skills 
more actively’ he warned ‘we shall increasingly find that the opportunities are no longer open 
to us and that other disciplines will fill the roles which we are well qualified to fill’ (Coppock 
1974 15). Whilst conscious of the maxim only fools rush in, Coppock’s warning has catalysed 
a generation of debate but lost none of its bite.  
 
In pursuit of ‘Brexit Geographies’  
 
In his 1984 ‘historical materialist manifesto’ for the study of the ‘history and present condition 
of Geography’, David Harvey famously argued that all geographical knowledge is produced 
within history (Harvey 1984).  The story of the history of Geography could not be told apart 
from the story of the history of European exploration, racism, empire and science, western 
global politico-economic hegemony, and the changing needs of mercantile, industrial, and 
finance capital. In The Geographical Tradition, David Livingston (1994) commented upon the 
particular challenges which attend to writing contextualist histories of still live, fledgling and 
yet to be fully formed geographical traditions.  Yet, historians of Geography are already alert 
to the imprint of western civilisation’s twentieth and early twenty-first century existential crises 
and melancholic malaise on geographical thought (Harvey 1989). In time, these histories will 
surely come to register the particular significance of globalisation, the legacy of tenacious 
imperial thought structures, uneven geographic development,  the current dislocate between 
popular sovereignty and representative democracy, and the surge, albeit uneven, throughout 
the advanced capitalist world of political populism and consequential ‘earthquake’ elections 
and referenda which have shocked the body politic. Whilst the Right has shown itself to be 
particularly adept at seizing the moment (Trump, Farage, Hofer, Wilders, Kurz, Orban and Le 
Pen, Bolsonaro), Left populisms too have entered the fray (for example Syriza, Podemos, 
Costa, Sanderson, Corbyn). This age of chaos and turbulence is undoubtedly exerting influence 
on our discipline by working as a disruptive force, provoking introspection, reflexivity, and 
new conceptual and methodological orientations.  
 
By way of framing the SI, this Introduction develops the argument that insofar as it is 
confronting, complicating and challenging existing geographical ideas and debates, Brexit is 
already recursively intruding on and perhaps even implicating itself in the structuration of 
geographic thought and practice, at least in countries most impacted and especially with respect 
to political geographical research. A completing/completed Brexit we suggest may bequeath a 
tradition of ‘Brexit Geographies’ and end up leaving a lasting signature on the stratigraphic 
record of Anglo-European geographic thought. We delimit the geographical scope of our claim 
with care; only metropolitan arrogance would presume that Brexit is of world historical import 
and it is likely that its signal will fail to leave much of a trace in geographical traditions 
elsewhere and particularly in the Global South.     We now develop our argument through five 
provocations, questioning the ways in which Brexit exists as a troubling reality for: a) critical 
policy studies; b) the project of decolonising geography; c) historiographies of human 
territorialisation and sovereignty; d) the status evidence-based public policy in a post-political 
and post-truth age, and; e) scholarship on hazards, risk, disasters and resilience.  By presenting 
itself as an anomalous protrusion in these arenas of geographical enquiry, Brexit may result in 
each case in new foci, fresh concepts, revised understandings, recalibrated priorities, and 
altered methodologies.  
 
Brexit Geographies: Five Provocations 
 
Why did the British public vote for Brexit? Political scientists and electoral geographers have 
pored over the details of  both the Leave and Remain votes and reached a number of shared 
conclusions (see Johnston et al. in this collection - and Becker et al. 2017, Manley et al. 2017, 
Zhang 2018,  Lee et al. 2018; Leslie and Ari 2018). In the welter of analyses, distinctions need 
to be made between the associated, as opposed to the causal, factors linked to the Leave vote. 
 
Invariably, and notwithstanding the fact that the Leave campaign attracted affluent rural voters, 
Brexit came to be associated with the politics of the urban ‘left behinds’.   In this sense the vote 
to Leave has been characterised as a ‘revolt of the rustbelt’ (see Macleod and Jones in this 
collection – and Dorling 2016, Goodwin and Heath 2016,  Hobolt 2016,  Calhoun 2016,  Jensen 
and Snaith 2016 Ford and Goodwin 2017,  Hazeldine 2017,  Bromley-Davenport et al. 2018, 
Gordon 2018).  Globalisation, neoliberalism, inequalities, the global financial crash and 
austerity have combined, it seems, to effect a growing dislocation between representative 
democracy and popular sovereignty. Counterposed to the ‘globalists’ and hypermobile 
‘anywheres’, the left behinds constitute the ‘somewheres’ (Goodhart, 2017), marked by 
particular class, education and age profiles, and anchored in places often rendered redundant 
by global capital, abandoned it seems to managed decline, and reeling from a decade of 
austerity (see Macleod and Jones in this collection, Picketty 2014). In the UK and more 
specifically England it is supposed, this historical dynamic has played itself out in the form of 
the accelerated growth of London and the South-East and comparative lack of prosperity and 
opportunity in other regions, in particular Northern regions, a growing sense in the latter of 
limited futures and alienation, and a vote to Brexit from the EU (Daly and Kelly 2015, McCann 
2016, Hobolt 2016, Parkinson 2016, North 2016, Brakman et al. 2018, Watson 2018). 
 
Perhaps the yardstick for any purposeful political response to Brexit then might be the extent 
to which it addresses the plight of those communities excluded from the globalisation project. 
But immediately, it becomes clear that Brexit constitutes an elusive object of enquiry: we might 
wish to speak truth to power, but this if problematic given that the ancien régime is split on 
Brexit.  In fact, leaving the EU is as much an  elite project as it is a populist one: likewise the 
campaign to reverse the vote to leave is being led by liberal elites but not exclusively so (See 
MacLeavy in this collection  - and Anderson and Wilson 2018). Perhaps we might conclude 
that whether Brexit happens or not is to an extent a diversion, what matters most is that the UK 
state attends to the historic inequalities which gave rise to the vote to leave in the first instance. 
There will be no ‘Global Britain’ without an inclusive Britain. Equally, there will no consensus 
to reverse Brexit unless a compelling case is made that inequalities will be most effectively 
addressed inside rather than outside the EU. Whether a high achieving Global Britain will 
eventually emerge remains to be seen; whether such a Global Britain will be pursued (by choice 
or coercion) through a low road strategy (a small low tax and hyper liberalised open economy 
competing on the base of cost and participating in the global race to the bottom) or a high road 
strategy (a high value added, high skill, high investment, high technology and high productivity 
economy) remains an open question. 
 
But it would be a mistake to approach Brexit as a sideshow. Brexit is surely no distraction, 
obfuscating class politics. So profound is this disruption that its unfolding will make a material 
difference to the kinds of politics which are actually possible. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that critical geographical scholarship ought to have a view on the virtues and vices 
of Brexit, whether occurs or not and how hard or soft it might be. 
 
And so we reach our first provocation: some time ago, in the same themed intervention of 
TIBG convened by Coppock noted above,  David Harvey (1974) famously asked ‘What kind 
of Geography for what kind of public policy?’; lest their intellectual labour be appropriated, 
academic freedom impaired, and capacity for criticality compromised, there must exist a clear 
distance if not dissonance between scholars and the corporate state, construed as a ‘proto-
fascist’ technocratic instrument to preserve and strengthen the status quo.  Brexit demands a 
response from critical policy studies. But it is difficult to know what kind of geography is best 
placed to inform a critical policy framing of Brexit because it is difficult to know what kind of 
public policy Brexit is. How can one speak truth to power when it is unclear which policy 
option is the preserve of power? What is critical policy studies to do in an age of populism, 
when there is an apparent elision of interests between societal elites and ‘we the people’? The 
key question to ask then is; what kind of Brexit for what kind of public policy for what kind of 
Geography? Or alternatively; what kind of remain for what kind of public policy for what kind 
of Geography?   
 
Other commentators have sought to apprehend Brexit as a post-imperial ‘nationalist spasm’, 
incorporating a wider set of  constituencies (including middle class and rural England) failed 
by the decline of the British empire and the UKs diminishing political and economic 
significance in the world (see Sykes in this collection). Brexit is a nostalgic reflex which betrays 
an imperial yearning to restore Britain’s lost place in the world (Bachmann and Sidaway 2016, 
and Picker et al. 2018, Dorling and Tomlinson 2019). In their book Small Brittania Dorling 
and Tomlinson (2019 15) capture this line of argument succinctly: ‘in the near future the EU 
referendum will become widely recognised and understood as part of the last vestiges of empire 
working their way out of the British psyche’. And so ‘Global Britain’ invokes without effort 
hierarchies and thought structures still lingering from the days of the British Empire and pivots 
without hesitation to the British Commonwealth for trade deals. Construing the EU as an anti-
democratic imperial institution, it betrays a metropolitan anxiety that a bad deal will mean it 
will be reduced itself to a ‘vassal’ state or colony of the EU.  Displaying a bizarre colony envy, 
it ruminates on the possibility of creating a ‘Singapore on the Thames’. 
 
This claim opens up fascinating new terrain for postcolonial scholarship which has sought to 
deconstruct ingrained colonial and metropolitan frames – orientalism and equivalents – which 
still run deep in European thought. In some ways Brexit endorses what post-colonial scholars 
have always suspected; imperial mentalities lurk deep in the dark recesses of the British mind.  
Only now, instead of seeking to provincialise, relativise and historicise ebbing and subsiding 
imperial epistemologies, postcolonial scholarship is being confronted by a resurgent reification 
of colonial imaginaries. Brexit gives new purpose to Postcolonial Geography. The project to 
decolonising geographical thought is assuming new urgency.  Unveiling the illusion that 
Britain remains vital in world history may yet be part of a wider move to encourage sobriety 
which may yet in turn save the country from itself. Psychoanalytic self-reflection and mindful 
meditation on crippling interior anxieties – surrounding fears both that the UK will be humbled 
into subservience through a soft-Brexit or unable to survive alone if cut adrift by a hard Brexit 
-  may in time prove healing.    It could enable an improved approach to international relations. 
It might help to address the changing atmosphere which has underpinned the politics of 
hospitality in the UK where Brexit has impacted upon immigrant communities (Doherty 2016, 
Goodwin and Milazzo 2017) whom have fallen prey to increased racial violence, revanchist 
nationalism, a re-borderings of various sorts (see Wood and Gilmartin and Cassidy et al. in this 
collection – and Burnett 2017 Morgan 2017, Lulle et al 2018, Gilmartin et al 2018, Miller 
2018). It might also inform the prospects for UK expatriates dwelling in other countries amidst 
other cultures whose plight remains occluded (Higgins 2018, Benson et al 2018).  
 
This leads us to our second provocation: that the conjunction between post-colonial geography 
and the lingering vestiges of small Britannia, given new life in and through Brexit, has the 
potential to give new purpose and substantive subject matter to the project of decolonising 
geographical categories and modalities of analysis.  
 
As we complete this Introduction, (November 2018), the UK and the EU have it seems 
managed in the end to secure a Withdrawal Agreement. But much uncertainty persists.  Res 
publica remains up for grabs. Whether the politicians who brokered the agreement can survive, 
and whether this agreement can survive parliamentary scrutiny in the UK and the remaining 
EU27 states remains in question (Anthony 2017, Hayward and Murphy 2018).    Published 
alongside the Withdrawal Agreement was a non-binding Political Declaration, providing an 
overview of the intended future relationship between the UK and EU. This too remains a work 
in progress. If ‘nothing can be agreed unless everything is agreed’, what use is a Withdrawal 
Agreement if a Political Declaration does not follow and secure binding consent? There persists 
a risk that the UK might exit the EU without a deal, recast its relationship with the EU in terms 
of less favourable World Trade Organising  rules, and do the unthinkable, fall of the much 
feared cliff edge.   Meanwhile, the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland continues to 
agitate for greater parity of treatment with the rest of the UK, whilst Scotland, Wales, London, 
and other countries and regions who voted Remain seek differentiation, special dispensations 
and opt out clauses.   All the while, unless their concerns are heeded by the political class, the 
country’s urban ‘left behinds’ increasingly display a proclivity towards regressive senses of 
place making and claiming,  demarcating, inevitably sometimes through violent means,  who 
has a right to belong in British cities and neighbourhoods.   
 
In his book The Birth of Territory, Stuart Elden (2013) argues that  it is important to approach 
the idea of human territoriality conceptually and historically.  For Elden human 
territorialisation – understood as a ‘bundle of technologies’ used to stake a claim on a bounded 
territory – has been much longer in germination than Westphalia; key supporting concepts were 
developed from as early as the classic period (by the Greeks and Romans), evolved throughout 
the medieval dark ages and came to fruition in the West during the Renaissance and Age of 
Reason.Third provocation: Brexit constitutes an important chapter in the history of human 
territorialisation in that it has proven midwife to a new ‘bundle of technologies’ centred upon 
state building after the era of the supra-national state, the difficulties of maintaining the 
territorial integrity of the state when the interests of nations and regions dislocate, and new 
bordering strategies and tactics in UK cities which house ethnic minority populations. There is 
a need to explore the forms of both hard power and soft power which are being deployed by 
and in the EU and  the UK to create and discipline European and British political and cultural 
subjectivities, to claim space, to build real and imagined walls, and to invoke and defend turf. 
Brexit we might surmise, is both reproducing and developing historically new technes of spatial 
control and regulation.  
 
The Brexit debate is riddled with many of the maladies and inflictions which characterise our 
post-political and post-truth present. Rarely has the public square been perverted by such 
hostile thought policing and such a scale of tactical inaccuracies, exaggerations and partialities. 
This diminution  in public discourse is playing itself out in the politics of the academy. Right 
critics, of course, lament the left-liberal capture of the university, the ‘closing of the American 
mind’ and the putative lack of tolerance and criticality within critical scholarship, embodied in  
the science wars, and the ‘Sokol’ and ‘grievance studies’ hoaxes. Informed by these critics, 
prominent Leave campaigners have dismissed much academic research as little more than anti-
Brexit propaganda.  But equally, unquestionably, the corporate state which David Harvey 
foresaw in 1974 has mutated and deepened.  Whether it be cast in terms of impact, civic 
engagement, useful learning, knowledge exchange, technology readiness levels, co-creation or 
more profoundly the enlargement of the intellect and ‘ennoblement’ of the citizenry, 
universities are once again placing under heightened scrutiny the reach of their research beyond 
the walls of the academy. This turn to impact has great potential; but it is also freighted with 
great risk. Left and left-liberal critics lament the imposition of anti-democratic neoliberal and 
neoconservative forces on scholarship and question whether the ascendance of neoliberal 
governmentalities and the academic entrepreneur and consequent reconfiguration and 
privatisation of the heretofore public university have crushed the safe spaces so necessary if 
pursuit of truth is to prosper.   
 
There has never been a more important moment to revive and reaffirm the importance of 
evidence-based public policy. This paves the way for our fourth provocation - that Brexit 
serves to heighten awareness of the intensified post-political and post-truth public realm which 
now imperils democracy and threatens to engulf the academy and has created space for a 
reaffirmation of rigorous evidence based public policy.   
 
What does rigorous social science tell us about the likely impacts of Brexit? Of course, the 
uncertainties surrounding Brexit mean taht we cannot say for sure  what its likely impacts will 
be. There is simply too much contingency, even for contingency planning. But, in reality, there 
are precious few reasons to prefer optimism over pessimism. With few exceptions most social 
scientific economic impact assessments conclude that Brexit, whether ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ will 
depress and damage the UK economy and result in slower growth in the UKs’ city-regions than 
would otherwise be the case (Pollard 2018, Brakman et al. 2018).  
 
Six conclusions are garnering favour in the research community: first. Brexit is already 
impacting negatively on the UK economy (a claim affirmed periodically and surely by 
Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney);  second,  Brexit is likely to depress the UK 
economy into the foreseeable future (Dhingra et al. 2016a); third, the harder the Brexit the more 
damaging its effects will be (Greater London Authority 2017);  fourth, it will be difficult for 
good trade deals with other countries to mitigate losses incurred by reduced trade with the EU 
in the short and medium term (Colanstone and Stanig 2018; Dhingra et al. 2018a 2018b); fifth, 
city-regions in the UK will be more impacted than those in the rest of the EU, with the 
exception of the Republic of Ireland (Chen et al. 2018, Lai and Pan 2018, Lavery et al. 2018); 
sixth, Brexit will have different consequences for different UK city-regions (and also rural 
areas – see Maye in this collection, and social and demographic groups – see MacLeavy in this 
SI), ironically impacting most negatively those northern city-regions and rustbelt blue collar 
towns who voted for it (Los et al 2017, Dhingra et al 2017, McCann 2018 North 2017, Di 
Cataldo 2017). (Dory 2017, Dinghra et al. 2017,  Hall and Wojcik 2018, Greater London 
Authority Report 2017).      
 
These problems have been magnified by the UK government’s poor level of preparedness for 
Brexit. Even if a Political Declaration can be agreed and developed into a legal Treaty,  it is 
unlikely that the British Civil Service will be in a position to implement any such Declaration 
given projected timelines (Owen et al, 2017). In every sense, Brexit fails what Tom Megs 
(Chief Executive of the Government’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority) has called the 
‘Valley of Death’ test – the gap between developing policy and putting it into practice. 
According to Megs, Brexit has succumbed to the six ‘sins of project failure’: lack of clarity 
around project objectives; lack of alignment among stakeholders, unclear governance and 
accountability, insufficient resources, whether people or money, inexperienced project 
leadership and; overambitious schedule and cost. The risks which attend to this lack of   
capacity to implement Brexit at the level of the national state are amplified by the general 
unpreparedness of business, big and small, regional and local government and the third sector.    
 
And so this leads us to our fifth provocation; whilst there exists a vast array of conceptual and 
policy tools addressing risk, shock, resilience and how institutional capacity might be built to 
withstand disruption, these have been insufficiently applied and the UK appears to be generally 
unprepared to manage Brexit as a significant political hazard.  
 
Gilbert White once famously declared ‘floods are caused by god, natural disasters by man’ 
(sic) (Hinshaw 2006) an observation given expression in the equation R(isk) = H(azard) × 
Vulnerability. In turn, vulnerability we might say comprises three component parts: 
susceptibility (degree of susceptibility to hazards or likelihood of suffering harm), coping 
(capacity to cope with hazards or capacity to mitigate the impact of hazards when they do 
occur), and adaptation (ability to plan ahead to adapt to natural extremes or ability to minimize 
the degree to which exposure to hazards is increased by prior poor human decision making) 
Social, economic, cultural, and political processes determine a society 
nation/region/community’s degree of susceptibility, coping capacity, and ability to adapt – 
creating uneven geographies of vulnerability. From our analysis above, we understand Brexit 
at root to be a cri-de-coeur from left behind people, places and communities rendered 
redundant by globalisation, deindustrialisation and neoliberal policy and most recently a 
decade of austerity.  Whilst tending to vote in favour of Brexit, we also understand that these 
places suffer from greater susceptibility (likelihood of suffering harm),  weaker coping 
capacities (are less able to withstand the shock), and weaker adaptation capacities (ability to 
put in place Brexit mitigation strategies). And so we ask, how might these places deal better 
with Brexit risks which they have brought upon themselves?  
 
In his 2010 Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation British 
geographer Mark Pelling cautions against promoting resilience as always and everywhere the 
goal of disaster management (Pelling, 2010). Pelling calls for more attention to be given to the 
ways in which hazards play into the politics that prevail in countries. He deploys the term 
“disaster politics” to refer to the ways in which hazards interact with the existing political order, 
consolidating, destabilizing, and transforming this order in different circumstances. Societies 
that frame comprehensive disaster management in terms of the pursuit of greater resilience 
need to recognize that in so doing they are making a political choice about the kind of future 
they want. Thinking in terms of resilience implies prioritizing bounce-back (to return to the 
status quo). In fact, disasters provide opportunities to bounce forward (to establish a new and 
better equilibrium state). According to Pelling, natural hazards can lead to “resilience,”  but 
also there can be “transition”  (institutional evolution and strengthening) and “transformation” 
(institutional tabula rasa) outcomes.  
 
The new UK2070 Commission independent inquiry into city and regional inequalities in the 
UK hints at what is required if transition and transformation are to buffer regions against 
Brexit’s worst effects. At one level, English devolution, the establishment of new city regions, 
the election of metro-mayors and further waves of city-deals which transfer meaningful powers 
and resources to local polities constitute an encouraging response. The UK remains one of the 
most centralised states in Europe, to a fault.  But Brexit has arrested and occupied the attention 
of the UK state to the degree that the devolution appears to have slowed if not stalled (or, from 
the perspective of the devolved nations, is a development that can for now be ignored). There 
exists a need to further build a political coalition in favour of devolved responsibility; in this 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Greater London, and wider groupings such as the Northern 
Powerhouse have a vital role to play. But still, it is likely that the UK government will continue 
to preside over most of the state’s budget.  There will be a need for more spatially sensitive 
national policies. Is there room for a national spatial strategy? What will become of the Shared 
Prosperity Fund, the UKs answer to forgone EU Structure Funds? Despite protestations to be 
‘place conscious’, will the UKs emerging Industrial Strategy and Infrastructural Strategy 
support balanced regional development? 
 
Conclusion  
An orphan of the rise and reign of the West, it is only to be expected that in its concepts, 
methods, foci, and practices, human geography (at least as practiced in the UK and in 
continental Europe) will bear the imprint of the faltering of western imperial prowess, 
globalisation, the affliction of uneven geographical development and socio-spatial inequalities, 
more polarised and polarising politics, rising populist and nationalist movements, and a more 
inhospitable climate for those deemed ‘other’ and ‘foreign’. Brexit constitutes a particularly 
consequential expression of these processes as they combine into a perfect storm.  In this 
Introduction to the SI, we have argued that a completing/completed Brexit may in the end 
deposit in its wake a tradition of Brexit Geographies and etch itself in the stratigraphic record 
of Anglo-European geographic thought, particularly political geographical thought. We have 
argued that Brexit presents as an anomalous protrusion in at least five key domains of 
geographical inquiry. We have developed five provocations, which can be summarised, along 
with key questions which they prompt,  thus:  
• Brexit and Remain are at once both elite and populist political projects complicating 
critical policy studies’ ambition to speak truth to power. What is critical policy studies 
to do in an age of populism and with public policies such as Brexit?   
• Brexit is steeped in a lament on the demise of the British empire,  melancholy and 
neurosis over the loss of halcyon days of yesteryear, when Brittania ruled the waves, 
and an penchant for nostalgia and enthusiasm to reanimate colonial mentalities and as 
such sits in productive tension with the postcolonial project of decolonising geography.  
In what ways does Brexit furnish Postcolonial Geography with new urgency and 
purpose?  
• Construing human territorialisation as historical and processual, Brexit can be 
understood as a progenitor of new governing ‘technologies’ which enable 
old/established and novel/fresh claims to be made on space and territory. In what ways 
has Brexit reinforced and/or innovated particular technes of spatial control in the 
governmental machine of the west, and fostered new kinds of deterritorialising and 
reterritorializing strategies? 
• At a time when the public sphere is being cleansed of genuine agonistic debate and truth 
is in question, Brexit is at once a benefactor of and source of encouragement for our 
increasingly post-political and post-truth public age; but it is also a catalyst for renewed 
interest in evidence-based public policy, rigorous policy testing and evaluation and the 
application of objective data. In the present climate, how might geographers conduct 
rigorous evidence based assessments of the efficacy of public policies?    
• At a time when scholars of hazards are developing sophisticated understandings of 
disasters, risk, and resilience, Brexit has been accompanied by a curious failure to 
prepare and to plan. If Risk = Exposure (Brexit, whether soft or hard) x Vulnerability 
(regional susceptibility, coping capacity, adaptation strategies), who is most at risk from 
Brexit, where, why, and what might be done about it?  
 
And so we return to David Harvey’s (1984) ruminations ‘on the present and future condition 
of Geography’. According to Harvey, consciousness of the historicity of geographical 
knowledge is a necessary precursor to any repurposing of the discipline. As Brexit unfolds, 
Anglo-European human geographers will do well to heighten awareness of the insinuation of 
this moment of geopolitical rupture in geographical thought and to keep a vigilant watch on 
the nature and implications of emerging ’Brexit Geographies’. For at least in this region of the 
world,  a new chapter in the history of the discipline – or at least the systematic branch of 
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The European Union Referendum Act receives Royal Assent. A referendum confirming or repealing 
the UKs continued membership of the European Union (EU) to be held before the end of December 
2017. 
June   2016 Referendum on Brexiting from the EU held. The question posed: 
Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?  
48.1% vote to remain. 51.9%  vote to leave. 
June 2016  
July 2016 
UK PM David Cameron resigns 
Theresa May appointed UK PM 




The European Parliament appoints MEP Guy Verhofstadt as its chief Brexit representative.  
January 
2017 
PM Theresa May delivers her ‘Lancaster House’ speech specifying the 12 priorities the UK government 
will use to negotiate Brexit. 
March 
2017 




The President of the European Council Donald Tusk publishes negotiation guidelines for the ‘EU 27’ 
(the EU members excluding the UK). 
June 2017 Formal EU/UK negotiations to secure a Withdrawal Agreement begins. The chief EU negotiator Michel 
Barnier species three key EU demands: 1) that remaining UK payments to the EU be serviced (the size 
of the ‘divorce bill’), 2)  that citizenship rights be protected (EU citizens in UK/UK citizens in EU), 
and; 3) that no ‘hard’ border be erected between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. 
June 2017 Snap election called by PM Theresa May results in a lost majority for the Conservative Party. May 
remains PM by entering into a ‘confidence and supply’ deal with the Northern Irish Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). 
Sept 2017 PM Theresa May delivers her ‘Florence’ speech further clarifying UK ‘red lines’. 
December 
2017 
The UK and EU assert that whilst ‘sufficient’ progress has been made in the three key EU negotiating 
priorities, because of the UKs ‘red lines’,  there remains ambiguity over whether it is possible to settle 
on a Withdrawal Agreement that avoids a hard border in Ireland. 
March 
2018 
The UK and EU agree to a ‘transition phase’ which will last from March 29th 2019 until 31 December 
2020, conditional on both sides agreeing to a final withdrawal deal. 
March 
2018 
PM Theresa May delivers her ‘Mansion House’ speech setting out five foundations to underpin the 
UKs future relationship with the EU  
June 2018 The UKs ‘EU Withdrawal Bill’ receives Royal Assent and became an Act of Parliament. 
June 2018 The EU expresses concern about the UKs commitment to red lines which will necessitate the 
resurrection of a hard border in Ireland.  
July 2018 Theresa May published her ‘Chequers Plan’, proposing a ‘Common UK/EU Rulebook’ which would 
mitigate against the need for a hard border in Ireland.  
September 
2018 




Technical agreement reached between the UK and the EU in relation to the terms of the withdrawal of 
the UK from the EU (the Withdrawal Agreement). Published alongside the Withdrawal Agreement was 
a non-binding Political Declaration, providing an overview of the intended future relationship between 
the UK and EU. 
November 
2018 




Final date for Withdrawal Agreement to be concluded at the last European Council meeting of 2018. 
Beyond this date the risk of a ‘no deal’ outcome increases.  
Winter 
2018/9 
Any Withdrawal Agreement requires to be ratified for both houses of Parliament, EU 27 Parliaments, 
and the European Council and EU Parliament 
March 
2019 
The UK will officially leave the EU, either with a deal and on an orderly bases or without a deal and 





During the transition phase, the UK will remain a ‘practical’ member of the EU but without voting 




Unless there is an extension to the agreed transition period, the UK will fully break with the EU, begin 
its new relationship with the EU as a fully external member, and rest its relationships with other non 
EU countries. 
 
 
 
